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This paper introduces a variation of the public goods game where four groups compete to
win prizes. It uses experiments to consider behavioral and personality aspects, enablingus to
treat a new ﬁeld. As for the behavioral aspect, it emerges that intra- and inter-group awareness
is eﬀective in promotingcooperation. In addition, cooperative actions are observed in a
cooperative rather than uncooperative atmosphere. As for the personality aspect, the game is
examined from four standpoints, namely, preference for competition, preference for risk,
passion for proﬁt, and trust in others.
Keywords: Public Goods Game, Experiment, Group Competition, Personality, Culture
JEL Classiﬁcation: C92
I. Introduction
The voluntary cooperation of agents is vital in the real economy because many contracts
are incomplete and eﬃcient behavior cannot be formally enforced. Furthermore, many real-
world problems require cooperation in situations that involve free rider incentives. Based on
standard assumptions, the Nash equilibrium of games involving cooperation decisions is
ineﬃcient. This paper examines a variation of a one-shot public goods game to see how
cooperation is generated.
Marwell and Ames (1981) introduced a public goods game where individuals have
resources they can allocate; either for their own private consumption or the groupʼs public
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＊ Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research to Kazuhiro Arai is gratefully acknowledged.consumption. In their experiments, they used tokens that are worth more to the individual when
privately consumed, but generate more value to the group as a whole when used to provide
public goods. Numerous public goods game experiments show that people cooperate far more
than predicted by standard economic theory, which assumes rational and selﬁsh individuals.
However, another fact derived is that contribution to the group account is substantially below
the Pareto optimal level of 100%, while there is also considerable heterogeneity across
individuals in terms of their choice of contributions. This paper examines this latter
phenomenon by analyzingthe personality aspects of the players.
A characteristic of this paper lies in applying the public goods game to inter-ﬁrm
competition. The contest among four groups is investigated, whereby the four compete with one
another for the prizes obtainable in accordance with the amount of public goods collected in
each group. Six diﬀerent games are generated by three diﬀerent sizes of prizes and two diﬀerent
treatments. The treatments are concerned with the revelation of each playerʼs contribution to the
other group members and the playersʼ awareness of the other groups. The eﬀect caused by the
diﬀerence between the two treatments is called the “group eﬀect” in this paper since it is
attributable to intra- and inter-group awareness. The condition with some prizes is called the
“prize condition” and that without prizes the “no-prize condition” throughout this paper. Each
group plays a one-shot public goods game and the group that collects the highest level of
public goods wins the larger prize. The prizes are distributed equally to members, and are
hence also public goods within the groups. Individuals know the system of the prizes and
decide on their contribution level to the group account simultaneously and independently. This
paper considers not only the group eﬀect but also the eﬀect of personality, which generates one
piece of evidence of the need to examine personality in employment tests undertaken by real
world ﬁrms.
Some theoretical public goods games introduce prizes. Baik (2008) introduces a group-
speciﬁc public good prize, which is a public good within a group. The paper shows a situation
in which a local government has a budget for building a bridge and several communities
compete to win the budget. The local government selects the winning community according to
a rule based on voluntary contributions made by those livingthere. Baik et al. (2001) consider
contests with two groups, and models them as ﬁrst-price all-play auctions. A group expending
more eﬀort on the group than its rival is certain to win the prize, and the winning group pays
the hig her bid. Our rule for selectingthe winningg roup is similar to Baik et al. (2001). The
prize in our model is a group-speciﬁc public goods prize. These two papers employ models that
consider inter-group competition, so their models are similar to our setting to some extent. The
diﬀerence between our model and these models is that the public goods game is played inside
the group in the former but not in the latter. There are papers that investigate the use of prize-
based mechanisms to incentivize contribution to public goods, showing that they are an
eﬀective way of overcomingfree riding . Faravelli (2007) studies multi-prize contests as a
means of ﬁnancingpublic g oods and proved that it is optimal to set the last prize equal to zero.
Faravelli and Stanca. (2007) investigate single and multiple prize contests as incentive
mechanisms for the private provision of public goods. They found that contrary to theoretical
predictions, total contributions are signiﬁcantly higher in the one-prize contest. The model in
this paper uses the order of magnitude of public goods among the groups to incentivize
contributions to the group account. Prizes are public goods among group members in our
setting, but not in the models of the other papers. Namely, this paper investigates prize-based
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The main ﬁndings of our analysis can be summarized as follows. The ﬁrst ﬁndingis that
our new game enables us to open a new ﬁeld as an application of a public goods game to ﬁrm
competition. The second is that the cooperative actions of members can be promoted by
enhancing the comradeship of the group (by the group eﬀect). The third is that, in a cooperative
atmosphere, individuals increase their contribution levels when facingprizes but not when in an
uncooperative atmosphere. Finally, personality signiﬁcantly inﬂuences individual actions in a
game. The above-mentioned ﬁndings are analyzed based on four personality aspects, namely,
preference for competition, preference for risk, passion for proﬁt, and trust in others. These four
aspects inﬂuence individual actions under some conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II oﬀers interpretations of the game. Section III
presents the experiment. Section IV discusses our observations and results. Finally, Section V
summarizes the paper and provides concludingremarks.
II. Real World Interpretations
This section introduces some interpretations of our new game. The game used for our
experiments can be interpreted in the real world as follows. Suppose that four ﬁrms exist in the
market, where they compete for shares. An individualʼs contribution to public goods
corresponds to the level of his eﬀort toward the ﬁrm in the real world. Conversely, his
investment in private goods corresponds to the level of his eﬀort toward himself. The ﬁrm
enhances competitiveness by collecting public goods and the more public goods, the higher the
degree of competitiveness and the larger the proﬁts of the ﬁrm in the market.
One example of the individual eﬀort level for public goods is working overtime, while
investing in private goods corresponds to the private use of time. Although reducing overtime
work is worth more to the individual, workingextra hours g enerates more value to the ﬁrm in
our setting. By making members work extra hours, the ﬁrm raises competitiveness and they can
receive higher wages. By reducing overtime work, members can gain some beneﬁtb yb e i n g
free.
This paper introduces two conditions: the prize condition and the no-prize condition. The
former is a condition with some prizes and the latter is that with none. Before giving some
interpretations of the two conditions, we deﬁne two new games among groups: the single-prize
contest and the multi-prize contest. The former is a game in which a prize is given only to the
group winning the ﬁrst place. The latter is a game in which a prize is given to several groups.
The prize condition in our model is a multi-prize contest amongg roups. There are some
examples of single-prize contests among groups. One is a game in which the winner takes all.
An example of multi-prize contests is the case where market shares are determined in
accordance with the degree of competitiveness of each ﬁrm. The ﬁrm collectingthe most public
goods takes the largest market share.
The prize distributed to each group member can be interpreted as a bonus. When ﬁrms
make larger proﬁts, they often make bonus payment to their members especially in Japan.
Sometimes, bonuses are distributed with suﬃcient equality regardless of the contribution levels
of the workers to the ﬁrm. In other words, bonuses are one of the public goods within groups.
Another example of a prize is the amount that will be used for the facilities of the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm
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of facilities include fringe beneﬁts, recreation facilities, and the workingenvironment. All the
members in the group can beneﬁt from such facilities, regardless of their contribution to the
ﬁrm. Facilities in a ﬁrm are public goods among its members.
This paper also investigates the game from a personality aspect and suggests some
evidence for use in employment tests. With such employment tests, examiners often try to
gauge a job applicantʼs personality through interview. This paper provides some evidence in
support of a policy consideringnot only the applicant ʼs ability but also his/her personality by
showingthat personality sig ni ﬁcantly aﬀects contribution to the ﬁrm. The new application of
the public goods game opens the way to investigating ﬁrm competition and substantiates the
importance of worker personality in the ﬁrm.
III. The Experiment
The experiment was conducted in early 2008 in Japan and included observations made on
128 subjects. The subjects were students of several diﬀerent majors. The payoﬀ promised in
return for participation was extra credit points for the course they were taking. Some extra
points for higher payoﬀ were promised so that participants would have an incentive to play
their best. The 128 subjects were divided into 32 groups randomly. Each group consisted of
four individuals, each of whom was given a budget of 100 tokens. Each subject then had to
decide how many of the 100 tokens to contribute to private goods and how many of them to
public goods. The experiment is based on a linear public goods game with four players. Each
token invested in private exchange earned 1 point. Each token contributed to group exchange
earned 0.4 points for each subject in the group, regardless of which subject contributed. The
game was carefully explained so that they understood the mechanism and the implications of
the payoﬀ function. We did not impose any time limit, so the subjects had plenty of time to
decide. The payoﬀ rule, group size, rival groups, and total amount of tokens in the group were
all common knowledge. The subjects were not allowed to talk to each other. A one-shot public
goods game is basically used in the experiment. Before the game started, the subjects responded
to Questions Q 1.1 through Q 1.4 (with responses recorded on an 11-point scale, 0 through 10,
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree).





The amount of the public good of a group is supplied by the sum of all contributions gj
made to it by its members. The theoretical game prediction is complete free riding by all
subjects.
In this experiment four groups compete for the prizes. Three diﬀerent conditions and two
diﬀerent treatments are examined for each condition of the game, so it considers a total of six
diﬀerent experiments, namely Experiments 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3. Note that the left
side of the numbers denotes treatment and the right side condition. Explanations of the
treatments and conditions are given below.
Condition 1 is a no-prize condition for a game while Conditions 2 and 3 are prize
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above. However, four groups compete for prizes under Conditions 2 and 3. The group making
the largest contribution to the public goods wins the ﬁrst prize, the lower-contribution groups
take lesser prizes and the fourth leaves empty-handed. The prizes are equally distributed to each
member of the group. Condition 2 entails smaller amounts of prizes and Condition 3 larger
amounts. Table 1 shows the structure of prizes under three diﬀerent conditions. Under all
conditions, in the case of ties amongg roups, the prize was summed up and divided equally
amongthose tying .





where the amount of the public good of the group is the collective sum of all contributions gj
made to it by its members and P denotes the prize points distributed to each group member.
In Treatment 1, the subjects need not reveal their contribution levels to their group
members. In Treatment 2, they have to reveal their contribution levels to the other group
members after the game starts. Moreover, individuals are made aware of other groups before
Treatment 2 starts. Treatment 2 diﬀers from Treatment 1 in the followingaspects: One is
revealing of actions post-game and the other is awareness of the other groups. We refer to this
diﬀerence as the ʻgroup eﬀectʼ in our paper because it is the eﬀect caused by intra- and inter-
group awareness. It was not until all the games were over in the experiment that individuals
revealed their contribution levels. Therefore, the subjects could not observe whether the group
members had been cooperative or not.
Accompanyingthis experiment, the subjects responded to some questions that are shown
in Question Group 2 in the Appendix. These questions required them to imagine certain
situations of the game. The responses enable us to examine some interesting situations that are
diﬃcult to examine in an actually played game.
IV. Results
Figure 1 reports the distribution of contributions to public goods under Condition 1. For
ease of reference, Figure 2 presents the average contributions in all experiments.
We now list and investigate the implications of the data of our experiment. The
investigation in this section is undertaken from behavioral and personality standpoints.
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0 0 Condition 1
0 20 40 60 Condition 2
0 40 80 120 Condition 3
Notes: Points are distributed to each individual accordingto the public g oods level





TABLE 1. STRUCTURE OF PRIZES UNDER THREE CONDITIONSFIG 1. DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS IN CONDITION 1
FIG 2. AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS IN ALL EXPERIMENTS
Result 1: The average voluntary contribution to public goods diﬀers due to the group eﬀect.
Revealing contribution levels to others and the awareness of other groups together reduce free
riding in the game.
To test the diﬀerence between the two treatments, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are
undertaken. The diﬀerences are highly signiﬁcant in all conditions accordingto the tests ( P<
0.05; two-sided) . Individuals signiﬁcantly increased their contribution levels to the group
account in Treatment 2.
This result shows that revealingcontribution levels to other members and the awareness of
other groups together are an eﬀective means of raisingcontribution levels to the g roup account.
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The cooperative actions of members can be promoted by revealingcontribution levels to other
members and by enhancingthe comradeship of the g roup which, in turn, is enhanced by
makingthe members more aware of the other g roups.
Result 2: In Treatment 1, individuals tend to increase their contribution levels at the possibility
of prizes when others are cooperative but do not when others are uncooperative.
We deﬁne a cooperative atmosphere as a case where other members are going to
contribute 90 tokens to the group account and an uncooperative atmosphere as one where others
are going to contribute 10 tokens to the group account. Q2.1 and Q2.3 assume that individuals
are playingin a cooperative atmosphere, while Q2.2 and Q2.4 assume the opposite respectively.
The eﬀect caused by the introduction of prizes is called the “prize eﬀect”. A positive prize
eﬀect means that prizes promote cooperative actions.
Support for Result 2 comes from Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reports the average contribution
in cooperative and uncooperative atmospheres respectively, while Table 3 shows the proportion
of individuals with each of positive, zero, and negative prize eﬀects. The diﬀerence in the
proportion between positive and negative prize eﬀects is remarkably large in the cooperative
atmosphere in comparison with the uncooperative atmosphere.
When a group has a cooperative atmosphere, individuals tend to increase their contribution
levels by the eﬀect of prizes but do not in an uncooperative atmosphere, hence the prize eﬀect
works more strongly in a cooperative atmosphere. Most individuals are willing to cooperate if
they expect the same of others.
Next, we examine contribution levels by takingindividuals ʼ personalities into account. An
inspection of the data at an individual level shows that the subjects are heterogeneous.
Basically, subjectsʼ contribution decisions fall into three distinct categories: complete coopera-
tion, free riding, and the rest. Accordingly, this paper divides the subjects into the following
three types: cooperators, who are subjects contributing100 tokens to public g oods; free riders,
who are subjects contributingnot more than 50 tokens to public g oods; and the rest. The
numbers of cooperators and free riders in each game are shown in Table 4, with the sum of
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46.2 (33.1) Condition 1
20.6 (29.8) 73.7 (30.8) 69.6 (32.7) Condition 2
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. N=127
Average contribution
Uncooperative Cooperative No Information
15.6 (22.6) 67.1 (31.4)








Notes: “Cooperative” is concerned with the diﬀerence between Q2.1 and Q2.3.
“Uncooperative” is concerned with the diﬀerence between Q2.2 and Q2.4.
Positive
TABLE 3. THE PROPORTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH EACH PRIZE EFFECT (%)cooperators and free riders in each game being about 100 individuals.
The subsequent results show what kind of individual cooperates or free rides in six
diﬀerent experiments. In Tables 7 through 10, individuals are divided into two categories based
on their responses to Question Group 1 in the Appendix. Responses 0 through 5 are classiﬁed
as “negative” and those 6 through 10 are classiﬁed as “positive.” In the Mann-Whitney test,
however, we used the raw data. Tables 5 and 6 show the test results concerningthe di ﬀerences
in responses to Question Group 1 between cooperators and free riders in each experiment. For
example, Table 5 shows that in Experiment 1-1 signiﬁcantly more free riders agree with Q1.1
than cooperators.
Result 3: Free riders tend to consider competition desirable under Condition 1.
Support for this result comes from Tables 5 and 7. Q1.1 measures the extent to which one
feels competition is desirable and Table 7 shows the proportion of individuals who agree with
Q1.1. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of individuals who agreed with Q1.1
between cooperators and free riders in Experiment 2-1 (X
2(1)＝4.47, P<0.05). This result shows
that individuals with relatively low contributions to public goods tend to consider competition
desirable. By similar argument, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in Experiment 1-1 beyond a
0.05 level. Under the prize condition, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two in













85 63 67 54 24 Cooperators
44 30 39 27 21
101 106
74
TABLE 4. THE NUMBER OF COOPERATORS AND FREE RIDERS
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TABLE 6. MANN-WHITNEY TESTterms of the desirability of competition.
Individuals who consider competition desirable free ride under no-prize conditions and
take cooperative actions under prize conditions. As mentioned in Result 2, a cooperative action
is generated by the eﬀect of prizes. As shown in Table 7, the proportion of individuals agreeing
with Q1.1 amongcooperators is lower than that amongfree riders in all experiments. There is a
propensity for free riders to consider competition desirable, although it is insigniﬁcant in some
experiments.
Result 3 suggests that prize conditions can promote cooperation regardless of the
desirability of competition. It is useful to know the desirability of competition under no-prize
conditions in order to achieve cooperation, but less so under prize conditions. A number of
individuals may become conditional cooperators in situations with some prizes in the game.
This result is applicable to the ﬁrm competition described in Section 2.
Result 4: In Experiment 2-3, the proportion of people who would rather take an unstable job
with high income than a stable one with relatively low income diﬀers depending on whether
one is a cooperator or a free rider. Free riders show a relative preference for a stable job over
an unstable one.
To investigate the diﬀerence in risk attitude, the responses to Q1.2 are examined. It
classiﬁes individuals into two categories: more risk-averse and less risk-averse individuals. This
paper deﬁnes those individuals who agree with Q1.2 as less risk-averse and those who disagree
as more. Table 8 shows the relation between the preference for risk and contribution levels in
all experiments. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of individuals who agreed
with Q1.2 between cooperators and free riders in Experiment 2-3 (X
2(1)＝4.01, P<0.05). The
diﬀerence is also highly signiﬁcant beyond a 0.1 level accordingto the Mann-Whitney test. As
shown in Table 5, there is also a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion in Experiment 2-2
beyond a 0.1 level. These observations lead to Result 4. However, there are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in other experiments between cooperators and free riders with regard to Q1.2.
There are two points to be remarked. The ﬁrst is that this result is observed in the game
with larger amounts of prizes. Prizes are public goods among group members in the model, so
the fear of being exploited by free riders through prizes is similar to that through public goods.
Contributingto public g oods and expectingprizes equally require them to trust others. More
risk-averse individuals contribute relatively less to public goods under a large risk than less
risk-averse individuals. The second point is that this result is observed in Treatment 2. Tables 5
and 6 show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between cooperators and free riders with respect to
preference for risk in Treatment 1. Based on this result, we can conclude that risk diﬀers in
Treatments 1 and 2. Perhaps, subjects feel risks more real when they are aware of their and
other groups.
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1-2
Free riders




18.8 17.5 17.9 18.5 8.3 Cooperators
29.5 26.7 33.3 33.3 28.6
18.9
TABLE 7. THE PROPORTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO AGREE WITH Q1.1 (%)Result 5: There is a diﬀerence in the degree of passion for proﬁt between cooperators and free
riders. Free riders tend to pursue proﬁt by any means.
Support for Result 5 is shown in Tables 5, 6, and 9. To investigate the diﬀerence between
cooperators and free riders in terms of the degree of passion for proﬁt, we examine the
responses to Q1.3. Table 9 shows the proportion of individuals who agree with it among
cooperators and free riders. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of individuals
who agreed with Q1.3 between cooperators and free riders in Experiment 1-1 (X
2(1)＝4.93, P<
0.05). There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences in Experiments 1-2 and 1-3 beyond a 0.1 level.
However, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in Treatment 2. In Experiment 1-1, the diﬀerence
is again highly signiﬁcant accordingto the Mann-Whitney test ( P< 0.05; two-sided). This is
also true in Experiment 1-2 and Experiment 1-3 (P< 0.1; two-sided). As shown in Table 9, the
proportions amongfree riders exceed those amongcooperators in all experiments. However, the
table shows that some free riders who are passionate about pursuingpro ﬁt may become
conditional cooperators due to the group eﬀect. These analyses of observations lead to Result 5.
As shown above, knowingindividuals ʼ personalities, their passion for proﬁt in particular, is
essential to achievingcooperation with a hig h probability. Knowingmembers ʼ passion to pursue
proﬁt is especially important in situations where they are less aware of their group and other
groups.
Result 6: There is a diﬀerence between cooperators and free riders in terms of the degree of
trust in others in Experiment 2-1. Among cooperators there is a relatively large proportion of
individuals who expect others to be trustworthy.
This paper examines the responses to Q1.4 in order to investigate the diﬀerence between
cooperators and free riders in terms of the degree of trust in others. As shown in Tables 5 and
6, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of individuals who agreed with Q1.4
between cooperators and free riders in Experiment 2-1 (X
2(1)＝5.96, P<0.05). The diﬀerence is
also highly signiﬁcant beyond a 0.1 level accordingto the Mann-Whitney test. These analyses
of observations lead to Result 6.
As shown in Table 10, the proportion of individuals who agree with Q1.4 in Treatment 2
increased amongcooperators and decreased amongfree riders by the e ﬀect of prizes. The prize
conditions tend to make distrustful people more cooperative even though they face more risk of







52.9 52.7 52.4 52.2 50 45.8 Cooperators
50 36.7 35.9 33.3 28.6
TABLE 8. THE PROPORTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO AGREE WITH Q1.2 (%)
1-2
Free riders




40 34.9 34.3 33.3 25 Cooperators
52.3 53.3 46.2 51.9 47.6
40.5
TABLE 9. THE PROPORTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO AGREE WITH Q1.3 (%)beingexploited by free riders.
Questions similar to Q1.4 are shown in Gachter et al. (2004). However, we used a very
simple question to measure one aspect of trust shown in Q1.4. Because diﬀerences in trust
levels generate diﬀerent actions, it is important to take them into consideration when aimingat
eﬃciency in a game. This result shows that we can raise our own interests by promoting
bondingwithin the ﬁrm under a no-prize condition. Arai (2007) shows the importance of trust
and trustworthiness in achievingeconomic e ﬃciency and points out that neoclassical economics
ignores it. Result 6 also implies that because culture determines trust levels to some extent, it
aﬀects eﬃciency or the amount of cooperation achieved within an organization.
As shown above, this paper considers a personality perspective. There are several diﬀerent
types of individuals in the real world, but most papers assume their own simpliﬁed
personalities. In contrast, this paper classiﬁes individual personality usingthe four aspects likely
to be inﬂuenced by culture, gender, and several other factors. Cross-cultural diﬀerences in
behavior are discussed in Roth et al. (1991), while some other papers discuss gender
diﬀerences. Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) found that men contribute more toward the
public good than women. This eﬀect also emerges in Sell (1997). In contrast, Nowell and
Tinkler (1994) ﬁnd the opposite to be true. Finally, Solow and Kirkwood (2002) ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the sexes. As shown above, results seem to diﬀer substantially
accordingto the context under consideration. This paper demonstrates that culture often
inﬂuences economic eﬃciency through personalities.
V. Conclusions
An individual sometimes makes his or her decisions under the restriction of beinga
member of a group or organization. This paper examines experimental evidence concerning
voluntary cooperation in inter-group competition involving a public goods game, where four
groups compete to win prizes. This game was used to measure the degree of voluntary
cooperation, since it is not driven by repeated game incentives or reputational concerns. The
groups compete for the prizes and gaining a higher level of public goods means winning the
larger prize. Prizes are distributed equally to members, and are hence also public goods within
the group. The game helps us understand, for example, share competition among ﬁrms. This
paper investigates the game from both behavioral and personality perspectives and presents the
following ﬁndings.
One ﬁndingis that the cooperative actions of members can be promoted by revealingthe
contribution levels to other members and by enhancingthe comradeship of the g roup which, in
turn, is enhanced by makingthe members more aware of the other g roups. Another ﬁndingis
that the eﬀect of prizes, which increases contribution levels, is especially salient in a







52.9 50 44.4 52.2 50 50 Cooperators
56.8 56.7 69.2 63 57.1
TABLE 10. THE PROPORTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO AGREE WITH Q1.4 (%)cooperative atmosphere, but it is not in an uncooperative atmosphere.
This paper examines four aspects of personality: preference for competition, preference for
risk, passion for proﬁt, and trust in others. Free riders tend to consider competition desirable.
This holds true under no-prize conditions but not under prize conditions because many
individuals become conditional cooperators in the latter case. Risk-averse individuals reduce
their contribution levels under a larger prize condition, for fear of being exploited by free
riders. Individuals who ﬁercely pursue proﬁt tend to free ride in situations where they are less
aware of the other groups and their own members. Finally, individuals who expect others to be




Q1.1. I think that it would be better for Japan if people competed rather than cooperated.
Q1.2. I would rather take an unstable job with a high income than a stable job with a relatively low
income.
Q1.3. One has to pursue oneʼs proﬁt makingthe best use of one ʼs brain and, if legally allowed, exploiting
other people.
Q1.4. Most of the people in our society are concerned only with their own proﬁt.
For each of these questions, the respondents rated themselves on a 11-point scale (0=strongly disagree, 5=
neutral, 10=strongly agree)
Question Group 2
Q2.1. You are playing a public goods game (Condition 1). You have heard the informal information that
each of the group members except you will contribute 90 tokens to public goods. How many tokens do
you contribute to public goods in this situation?
Q2.2. You are playing a public goods game (Condition 1). You have heard the informal information that
each of the group members except you will contribute 10 tokens to public goods. How many tokens do
you contribute to public goods in this situation?
Q2.3. You are playing a public goods game (Condition 2). You have heard the informal information that
each of the group members except you will contribute 90 tokens to public goods. How many tokens do
you contribute to public goods in this situation?
Q2.4. You are playing a public goods game (Condition 2). You have heard the informal information that
each of the group members except you will contribute 10 tokens to public goods. How many tokens do
you contribute to public goods?
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